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Textualism and Legal Process Theory:
Alternative Approaches to Statutory Interpretation
Theodore W. Jones*
I. Introduction
Although it has repeatedly been called upon to interpret federal statutes, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has not done so in a consistent fashion.' In some 1994
cases, for instance, the Supreme Court abandoned traditional interpretive methods in
favor of less eclectic, textualist-based approaches. 2 In particular, consider MCI Tele-
* Theodore W. Jones is the Legislative Counsel to the Honorable W.J. Tauzin (Member, United
States House of Representatives); B.A., Political Science, Vanderbuilt University, 1994; J.D., Southern
Methodist-University School of-Law. This-Article is-dedicated-to-the very-special people who-have unfailingly
supported and encouraged all of my academic and professional endeavors - my mother, Sally W. Jones, my
father, Theodore L. Jones, my wife, Shelton M. Jones, and Marc I. Steinberg, Rupert and Lillian Radford
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
1. SEE ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14 (Amy
Guttman ed., 1997) (quoting from HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds,. 1994), "American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation."). See also, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13,
37-38 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge] ("The practice of statutory interpretation does not follow any single
inquiry .... (13) [a]s a positive matter .... courts.., follow a variety of approaches to statutes over time...
" (37-38)); Nicholas Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1597, 1614-15 (1991) ("Statutory interpretation is practical reason, dynamic interpretation, civic virtue,
imaginative reconstruction, common-law reasoning, hermeneutics, fact-finding, and administrative law, to
name but a few of the current samplings.").
2. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); City of Chicago v.
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571
(1994). See also, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An invitation to
cacaphony and incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV 749 (1995). These cases serve as
examples of the Supreme Court choosing to derive statutory meaning solely from an ordinary reading of the
statutory text in each instance- hence the term textualist-based approaches- while voicing a notable reluctance
to consider non-textual sources of law, such as legislative history/purpose, policy beliefs and context, political
circumstances, etc., when interpreting the statute in question. Because, however, non-textualist judges believe
that they are at liberty to draw from this wide variety of sources and experience when determining statutory
meaning, non-textualist approaches to statutory interpretation are said to be more eclectic than textualism. See
Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1600-15. In Central Bank of Denver, the Court determined that the statutory text of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits fraud in inducing the purchase or sale
of securities, clearly imposes liability on those who primarily engage in the fraud or deception but does not
reach those who only, secondarily "aid and abet" such activity. 511 U.S. 164, 177. Here, the Court rejected the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) argument that because the overall policy objective/purpose of
the securities laws is to punish all manipulative conduct surrounding securities transactions, Section 10(b)
should be broadly interpreted to also prohibit aiding and abetting despite what an ordinary reading of its text
might convey. 511 U.S. 164, 170-78. In City of Chicago, the Court reasoned that the plain language of Section
3001(i) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act does not exempt ash produced by a resource recovery facility's
burning of municipal solid waste from regulation as hazardous waste under Subtitle C of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 511 U.S. 328, 334-35. In the process, the petitioners' lengthy and
sophisticated explanation as to why, inter alia, the legislative and political history of Section 3001(i) justified
granting the exemption in this case was vigorously discounted. 511 U.S. 328, 335-39. In NLRB v. Health Care
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communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.3 In this case, the Supreme Court
embraced Justice Scalia's textualist approach, which William N. Eskridge, Jr.4 calls "the
new textualism,"5 and rejected the well established "legal process" theory of statutory
interpretation emanating from the work of Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks in the
1950's.
6
At the time of this legal dispute, MCI and AT&T had been competing "common car-
riers"'7 of interstate long distance telephone service since the early 1970's.8 As such, their
long distance prices were presumed to be subject to regulation under section 203 of the
Communications Act of 1934. 9 As enacted by Congress, subsections 203(a) and
203(b)(2) of the Act provided:' 0
(a) [e]very common carrier .... shall, within such reasonable time as the [Federal
Communications] Commission [FCC] shall designate, file with the Commission ...
all charges... for [the provision of] interstate .. communication [services] ..... ,11
... *(b)(2)
"[t]he Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, modify any re-
quirement made by or under the authority of this section ... " 12
On its face, this statutory language seems to make clear that Congress intended for the
203(a) charge filing obligation to apply both to MCI and AT&T equally as common
carriers, barring, of course, a proper 203(b)(2) modification of such obligation by the
FCC.
By the time MCI v. AT&T reached the Supreme Court, however, clear inconsisten-
cies between regulatory actions taken by the FCC and certain judgments issued by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) had
& Retirement Corp., the Court struck down the NLRB's (the Board) interpretation of the phrase "in the
interest of the employer," as it appears in the National Labor Relations Act (Act), as contrary to the plain, or
textual, meaning of such statutory language. 511 U.S. 571, 580. In so doing, the Court discredited the Board's
position that its "unique" reading of this phrase was more consistent with the policy objectives of the federal
labor laws than a purely textual one inevitably removed from the special circumstances surrounding employer-
employee relations. 511 U.S. 571, 576-82.
3. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
4. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
5. The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L REv. 621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge].
6. See generally, HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994). This
article compares and contrasts textualism with the Hart and Sacks legal process theory as a non-textualist
approach to statutory interpretation. The theoretical discussion contained herein extends well beyond the brief
commentary regarding the primary differences between textualism and non-textualist theories provided above
in note 2.
7. The definition of common carrier has remained the same since 1934. Subsection 3(h) of The
Communications Act of 1934, before it was amended, and as amended, provided: "Common carrier" or
"carrier" is any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communications ...
Codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994).
8. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 218.
9. See id. at 220. The Communications Act of 1934 created and provided the statutory authority for the
FCC. It has been amended from its original form, as will be discussed further herein, infra note 35, and can
now be referred to as "the Act, as amended." What remains of the original Act is codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151
et seq. In this article, all references to the original Act are made to "the Act," and all citations are made to the
Act as it is codified in the United States Code. Section 203 of the Act is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 203.
10. As will be explained further herein, the language of subsections 203(a) and 203(b)(2) of the Act have
never changed. They both appear today exactly as they did when originally enacted in 1934.
11. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2).
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created some confusion as to whether subsection 203(a) actually applied to MCI as a
non-dominant carrier.' 3 Contrary to a prior 1985 D.C. Circuit decision that all common
carriers, whether dominant or non-dominant, were required to file charges under
203(a), 14 the FCC, relying on its 203(b)(2) modification power, lifted this filing re-
quirement for all non-dominant long distance carriers such as MCI in a 1992 Report and
Order (the 92 Order) pursuant to a rule-making proceeding.' 5  In that same year, AT
&T, which remained the only dominant carrier still apparently subject to 203(a), filed a
motion for summary reversal of this 92 Order in, of all courts, the D.C. Circuit. 16  Con-
sidering the legal effect of section 203 for yet another time, the D.C. Circuit granted
AT&T's motion on the ground that subsection 203(b)(2), although it gave the FCC
authority to modify the 203(a) filing requirement, did not give the FCC the authority to
exempt non-dominant carriers from this requirement.' 7  Shortly thereafter, MCI, along
13. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 220-23. See generally, In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, CC Docket No. 79-
252, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979); In the Matter of Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, CC
Docket No. 79-252, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 20-24 ( rel. Nov. 28, 1980) ("distinguished
between dominant carriers (those with market power) and non-dominant carriers (those without market power)
- in the long distance market." Id. at 30-49; MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 220); In the Matter of Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, CC
Docket No. 79-252, Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982); In the Matter of Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, CC
Docket No. 79-252, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983); In the Matter of Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carriers Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, CC
Docket No. 79-252, Fifth Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984); In the Matter of Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carriers Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, CC
Docket No. 79-252, Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985), rev'd, MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In the Matter of Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common
Carriers, CC Docket No. 92-13, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in substitute for adjudication between MCI
Telecommunications and American Tel. & Tel. Co., CC Docket No. 92-13, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 804, 807 (1992),
remanded, American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (denying the FCC's statutory
authority under subsection 203(b)(2) of the Act to have issued the Fourth Report and Order by citing and
affirming MCI v. FCC), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 913 (1992); In the matter of Tariff Filing Requirements for
Interstate Common Carriers, CC Docket No. 92-13, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8072 (1992), stayed
pending further notice, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 7989 (Nov. 25, 1992), motion for summary reversal granted, American
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC 1993 WL 260778 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
14. See MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186. As indicated supra note 15, this judgment had previously overturned
the FCC's Sixth Report and Order, which actually prohibited non-dominant carriers from filing tariffs
pursuant to 203(a) of the Act. See also, MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 221.
15. In the Matter of Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, CC Docket No. 92-13,
Rep. and Ord., 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8072 (1992) [hereinafter 92 Order]. See also, MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 223.
16. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 223.
17. Id. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 1993 WL 260778 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). In granting
AT&T's motion for summary reversal of the 92 Order per curiam, The D.C. Circuit cited its previous ruling in
AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (1992) as its legal basis for doing so. While this case is not addressed in the body
of this article, AT&T v. FCC, as indicated supra note 13, represents the D.C. Circuit's vacation of an earlier
attempt by the FCC, in its Fourth Report and Order, to make the 203(a) filing requirement optional for non-
dominant common carriers such as MCI pursuant to its 203(b)(2) modification authority. Most importantly,
the D.C. Circuit's ruling in AT&T v. FCC is not to be confused with its per curiam reversal of the
Commission's 92 Order, even though the party names are framed identically in each. It is ultimately the D.C.
Circuit's per curiam judgment that is reviewed by the Supreme Court in MCI v. AT&T.
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with the FCC, successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. 8 The Supreme
Court upheld the D.C. Circuit's ruling by a five to three majority in MCI v. AT&T' 9
MCI v. AT&T involves a simple question of statutory interpretation: whether the
word "modify," as found in subsection 203(b)(2) of the Act, means to make "minor"
changes or to make "basic and fundamental" (more substantial) changes.2 ° Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia determines that "modify. . .has a connotation of increment
or limitation," and therefore, can only mean "to change moderately or in minor fash-
ion." 2 1 Based upon this determination Scalia ultimately holds that because the 92 Order
eliminated the 203(a) tariff filing requirement for all long distance carriers except
AT&T, the FCC had imposed a revision of the statute too substantial to qualify as a
lawful 203(b)(2) modification.22 In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Stevens
argues that "modify," as used in 203(b)(2), should be interpreted more broadly so as to
encompass the FCC's regulatory action as a legal activity not in derogation of 203(a). 3
Scalia's legal conclusion is the product of a strict and formal adherence to the
statutory text of section 203. Conversely, Stevens reaches a polar legal conclusion con-
sistent with the venerable, purposive principles of the Hart and Sacks legal process the-
ory.24 Basically, Scalia sustains the definition of "modify" that comports with what he
believes to have been that word's plain meaning in 1934, the year in which the Act be-
came law.25 Stevens, however, objects to Scalia's narrow reading of "modify" primarily
because he feels it defeats the Act's overall legislative purpose.26 By embracing Scalia's
more narrow reading of "modify," the Supreme Court clearly abandons the traditional
legal process approach to statutory interpretation in MCI v. AT&T.27
Admittedly, a number of legal scholars have already devoted much commentary to
both textualism and legal process theory individually. 28 Consequently, this article's ob-
jective is to focus on one aspect of the textualist - legal process debate in MCI v. AT&T.
While Scalia concedes that a relaxation of the filing requirement for non-dominant car-
riers is a worthwhile proposal, he asserts that only Congress can broaden the statutory
definition of modify to encompass such a fundamental alteration of 203(a) by the Com-
mission.29 In this respect, his opinion can be perceived as an attempt to force a legisla-
tive update of the existing regulatory scheme set forth in section 203. Conversely, Stev-
ens' argument that the Supreme Court must itself interpret "modify" broadly enough to
18. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 223.
19. See 512 U.S. at 219. The majority consisted of Scalia, Rhenquist, Ginsburg, Thomas, and Kennedy.
The minority included Stevens, Blackmun, and Souter. Justice O'Connor took no part in the decision.
20. See 512 U.S. at 225 (Scalia, J.).
21. Id..
22. See id. at 230-32 (Scalia, J.).
23. See id. at 235-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 512 U.S. at 235, 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In attempting to effectuate purpose, Stevens
follows the Hart and Sacks legal process method for attributing and inferring the statutory purpose of the Act.
See HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1377-80.
25. See MCI v. AT&T, U.S. 512 at 228 (Scalia, J.).
26. See id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. The Supreme Court invalidated the FCC's 92 Order on the ground that the Commission's
interpretation of the term modify was contrary to the plain meaning of that term despite Stevens' argument that
the FCC had interpreted modify in a way that enabled it to carry out the purpose of the Act. See Pierce, supra
note 2, at 757.
28. For a discussion of Scalia's textualism, see Eskridge, supra note 5. For an excellent and thorough
discussion of the legal process approach to statutory interpretation, there is perhaps no better reference than the
Hart & Sacks treatise. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1374.
29. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 234 (Scalia, J.).
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encompass the 92 Order makes clear that he desires a judicial update of the section 203
regulatory scheme.30 Drawing upon this distinction, MCI v. AT&T serves as a case study
of whether judicial updating of obsolete statutes is better than forcing of legislative up-
dating through textualist interpretation.
Ultimately, I reach the conclusion that the forcing of legislative updating through
textualist interpretation, as advocated by Scalia, is more attractive than Stevens' legal
process justifications for judicial updating. This determination is based on a survey, in
Part I, of the broad-ranging theoretical justifications that Scalia and Stevens offer for
their respective views on statutory updating and conclusions of law in MCI v. AT&T. In
addition, my opinion stenis from a close examination, in Part II, of the new section 10
(section 10 of the Act, as amended, or section 10) 3 1 that Congress added to the Act by
passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996.32 In providing the FCC with authority that
the Supreme Court determined was not available to it under section 203(b)(2), section
10 can be perceived as a legislative update of the section 203 regulatory scheme. Based
on the high probability that the holding in MCI v. AT&T induced Congress to enact sec-
tion 10, I argue the validity of Scalia's principal dynamic claim that textualism will
force complete and adequate legislative responsiveness. 33 In the final analysis, I assert
that the validity of this claim is also what makes the textualist decision in MCI v. AT&T
so much more appealing than Stevens' legal process demand for judicial updating of
Section 203.
H. The Determinacy of Theory
Both textualism and legal process are determinative approaches to statutory inter-
pretation. This is to say that judicial adherence to either interpretive method will gener-
ally yield the arrived at legal conclusion in a given case.34 Because textualists and legal
process theorists have been known to reach antipodal conclusions of law, they are also
inevitably prone to promote divergent arguments concerning statutory updating. Essen-
tially, statutory updating can be explained as the practice of changing legal standards so
that they make sense in light of newly developing social conditions. Bringing statutes up
to date, therefore, is based on policy considerations. For a number of theoretical reasons
that I will address in this Part, textualists generally prefer that Congress update the law
while legal process theorists seem more eager to engage in updating it themselves by
dynamically interpreting statutes.
35
The case of MCI v. AT&T provides some valuable insight into the theoretical differ-
ences between textualism and legal process theory as systematic approaches to statutory
interpretation. Fundamentally, the clear tension between Scalia and Stevens can be at-
tributed to the counter assumptions that textualism and legal process theory advance
with respect to the nature of statutory law, the proper sources of law, and the proper role
30. See id. at 237-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 160.
32. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. Hereinafter, all citations to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 itself will be to the 96 Act. In addition, because the 96 Act amended the
Communication Act of 1934 (the Act), there will also be references to "the Act, as amended," which
represents the amended state of the Act after 1996. Where possible, statutory sections which appeared in the
Act before it was amended by the 96 Act, as well as statutory provision added to the Act, will be cited as they
are codified in the United States Code. Therefore, section 203 of the Act, which was not changed by the 96
Act, will be cited as 47 U.S.C. § 203. See supra note 9. New section 10 of the Act, as amended, which was
section 401of the 96 Act, is cited, consistent with its codification, as 47 U.S.C. § 160. See infra note 34.
33. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3-37.
34. See Zeppos, supra n. 1, at 1597-99; Eskridge, supra n. 5, at 640-42.
35. See SCALIA, supra n. 1, at 3-37; HART& SACKS, supra n. 8, at 1374-80.
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for each institutional branch of American government. Naturally then, it seems best to
discuss the debate in MCI v. AT&T according to these categories.
A. The Nature of Statutory Law
Scalia's textualism seeks to vest complete legal significance in "the import that
statutory language would have to a typical lay reader." 36 This priority appears to stem
from a two-fold assumption about statutes in general: because "the legislature almost
always adopts words with [their] common usage in mind," only the common usage of a
statutory word is worthy of complete legal effect.37 As the Justice has stated himself, "if
the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect- at least in the ab-
sence of patent absurdity." 38 For Scalia, the object of construing statutes is to discover
what the statute says as opposed to what the statute ought to mean. 39 As a result, Scalia
appears to believe that statutory law is a manifestation of the plain and ordinary meaning
of the statutory words, or text, in question.
In contrast, the legal process theory is based on the notion that legislators enact stat-
utes as the means of accomplishing a particular policy goal, social end, or purpose.40 As
Hart and Sacks have stated, "[statutory] law is a doing of something, a purposive activ-
ity. . . ."4 Legal process theory, therefore, requires that courts attach legal significance
to the meaning of words which best fulfills, or carries out, the overall purpose of the
statute(s) they comprise.42 Consequently, legal process theory appears to posit that plain,
ordinary meaning cannot always be synonymous with legal, or statutory meaning. In-
stead, statutory words should be interpreted to legally mean what they "ought" to mean
in light of statutory purpose and the facts at bar.43
Consistent with textualist principles, Scalia's narrow reading of "modify" in MCI v.
AT&T reveals what appears to be his strong faith in the finality of plain language. Be-
cause he is convinced that the word "modify," as used in subsection 203(b)(2), is clear
and unambiguous on its face, Scalia seems to view MCI v. AT&T as an open and shut
case.44 It is as though Scalia believes that the clarity'of the term "modify" alone resolves
the dispute between MCI and AT&T, thereby eliminating any need for extensive judi-
cial analysis. Upon determining with relative ease that the common usage of "modify"
signifies only limited dhange, Scalia keeps his legal analysis simple.45 Aside from dis-
cussing the sources from which he derives the meaning of "modify," Scalia does little
more than assert that the FCC's "wholesale abandonment" of the 203(a) filing require-
ment is illegal because it clearly represents a greater change of the regulatory scheme
than the limited and narrow change allowed by Congress in 203(b)(2). 46 In this respect,
36. A. Raymond Randolph, Looking it up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1437, 1441 (1994).
37. Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1621.
38. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment). See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 623.
39. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 13, 16-17.
40. See HART & SACKS, supra note 24, at 148.
41. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 148. See also, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Supreme Court 1993 Term- Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REV. 26, 96 (1994) [hereinafter
Eskridge & Frickey].
42. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 148; Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1600.
43. HART& SACKS, supra note 6, at 1374.
44. See MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 225-34 (Scalia, J.).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 221 (Scalia, J.) (Citing MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J.)).
Interestingly enough, Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion for the D.C. circuit in this 1985 case, which
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MCI v. AT&T can be perceived as upholding the notion that "when the text of a statute is
clear, that is the end of the matter. ' 4
In seeking to effectuate purpose, Stevens pays most attention to the statutory context
in which the term "modify" is used.48 He appears convinced that this term, because it is
employed in a statute enacted to accomplish a clear legislative purpose, must have a
special, or uniquely contextual, statutory meaning that is not necessarily narrowed by
prevailing usage.49 This is consistent with the legal process notion that when interpreting
statutes, one should "[ble mindful of the nature of language, and, in particular, of its
special nature when used as a medium for giving authoritative general directions."
50
Stevens is convinced that "modify," in the context of the Act, was meant to encompass
broad change even though the prevailing common usage of the term might implicate
more insignificant change. 51 He objects to Scalia's narrow reading because Scalia does
not consider that the statutory context in which Congress used the term "modify" as-
signs to that term a broader meaning than it otherwise may possess in a non-statutory
context.52
Adherence to statutory context, in this instance, also makes Stevens appear more
concerned than Scalia about reaching a desirable policy result in MCI v. AT&T. Stevens
argues that "modify," in the context of the Act, must signify broader change than Scalia
claims because the purpose of the Act itself is to allow the FCC to accommodate the
prevailing policy concerns in the communications industry.53 It is true that both Justices
seem to concede that a relaxation of the filing requirement for non-dominant long-
distance carriers may be appropriate by all conceivable standards.54 However, while
Stevens feels that this alone is reason enough to allow the 92 Order to stand, Scalia
points out that policy concerns cannot supercede the plain language of section 203.55
Addressing the utility of the 92 Order, Scalia states:
What we have here, in reality, is a fundamental revision of the statute,
changing it from a scheme of rate regulation in long-distance common-
carrier communications to a scheme of rate regulation only where effective
competition does not exist. That may be a good idea, but it was not the idea
that Congress enacted into law in 1934.56
Rejecting the notion that policy must prevail over the plain language of the Act, Scalia
seems to interpret the word "modify," as used in section 203(b)(2), more ndrrowly be-
cause he cannot understand how the ordinary person could possibly read that word as
broadly as Stevens.57 Unable to find any evidence that "modify" commonly means
"major change," Scalia, on behalf of the Court states, "'[mlodify,' in our view, connotes
considered the same issue that the Supreme Court entertained in MCI v. AT&T. See note 15. Her observation at
that time was that modify "suggest[ed] circumscribed alterations- not, as the FCC now would have it,
wholesale abandonment or elimination of a requirement."
47. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 16.
48. MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 240-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1374
51. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 235, 237-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 232-34 (Scalia, J.), 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 234 (Scalia, J.).
56. Id. at 231-32 (Scalia, J.).
57. See id. at 225-26 (Scalia, J).
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moderate change. '8 In true Hart and Sacks fashion, Stevens counters by attempting to
identify the purpose of the Act in terms broad enough to render Scalia's narrow inter-
pretation of "modify" insufficient as a matter of law.59 He claims that the purpose of the
Act provides the FCC (with) "unusually broad discretion to meet new and unanticipated
problems . . . ." in regulating the rapidly growing telecommunications industry.60 Stev-
ens argues that Scalia's reading of "modify" defeats this statutory purpose because it is
not broad enough to grant "the FCC... the flexibility Congress meant it to have in or-
der to implement the core policies of the Act in rapidly changing conditions. '61 Viewing
the changes imposed by the 92 Order as "fitting within" the scope of the statutory pur-
pose, Stevens believes that the correct legal usage of "modify" is that which expands
Scalia's version enough to include the exemption of non-dominant common carriers
under 203(a).62
Addressing concerns about the proper context in which to interpret section 203,
Scalia asserts that the "most relevant time" for determining a statutory term's meaning is
when the statute in question was enacted into law.63 Taking the premise that legal
meaning should comport with plain meaning one step further, Scalia reads "modify" as
he does on the ground that it meant "to change moderately" in 1934, the time at which
the Act became law.64 Such a reading is based on the belief that a statutory term's plain
meaning at the time of enactment should be given legal effect, for such meaning alone is
what the legislature votes on. 65 In turn, because legislatures adopt words with common
usage in mind, Scalia's textualism posits that a statutory term's meaning at the time of
enactment maintains the most political legitimacy and should consequently be re-
spected.66 This is to say that the meaning of statutory language does not change over
time, but rather applies prospectively and free from judicial alterations. 67 For Scalia
then, valuing the plain meaning of "modify" at the time of enactment inevitably "assures
that ordinary terms, used in ordinary context, will be given a predictable meaning.
' 68
From this perspective, Scalia suggests that the FCC has been on notice, since 1934, that
section 203(b)(2) does not support fundamental alterations of the 203(a) filing require-
ment.69 Because, however, he perceives the 92 Order as contrary to such a clear state-
ment by Congress in section 203, Scalia asserts that it is not entitled to the judicial def-
erence under the standards of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil.7
0
58. Id. at 228 (Scalia, J.).
59. See id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 228 (Scalia, J.).
64. Id.
65. Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1616-17.
66. Id.
67. Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1616-20. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 14-20.
68. Randolph, supra note 36, at 1441.
69. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 229-33 (Scalia, J.) (Concluding that the rate filing mechanism of the
Act is the central aspect of the regulatory system that has never been altered by Congress in any way, and is
therefore quite clear and important. The Commission, in Scalia's opinion, should have understood this.)
70. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court established that when courts interpret federal
statutes, they must first determine whether the particular statute in question is silent, or ambiguous, with
respect to an issue. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. If so, the courts then must defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of a statute. Id. On the other hand, if the statute is clear, then courts are expected to hold
agencies to the statutory standard issuing the pertinent instructions to them. See id. at 842-43.
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Despite the prevailing usage of "modify" in 1934, Stevens advocates an entirely
more "dynamic" view on interpreting section 203.7' While Hart and Sacks understood
law to be a "purposive process," legal process theory also demands that law "is a con-
tinuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living."72 To this extent, legal pro-
cess theory, through its school of thought which Hart and Sacks called "reasoned elabo-
ration," professes that courts are to interpret law in a way that develops and rationally
shapes it over time into a coherent, historical account of the rules which govern social
conduct.73 In this respect, reasoned elaboration advocates such as Ronald Dworkin por-
tray law as rules that are constantly harmonized through the loose interplay of institu-
tions, including, of course, the federal courts, which inevitably act to implement the
most socially appealing, empirical, or descriptive, policy preferences.74 This precept
requires courts to read statutory words so as to allow a particular agency authorized by
Congress to respond to a social crisis, provided that such response is consistent with the
statutory purpose, particularly when the agency in question is clearly best suited to do
so.
75
As the beneficiary of the Act's broad purpose, and in light of its technical communi-
cations expertise, Stevens feels that the FCC is clearly such an agency in this case.76 He
indicates that the FCC promulgated the 92 Order only after rational and careful consid-
eration of the state of competition in the long-distance market. 77 The fact that an exten-
sive administrative record had been developed concerning the appropriate use of the
tariff filing scheme is sufficient proof for Stevens to conclude that the FCC had suffi-
ciently explained its actions, had reached a consensus on the issue, and thereby had ra-
tionally acted to accommodate the goals and needs of the communications industry and
its consumers. 78 Even if he were to concede that the 92 Order did in fact broaden the
statutory meaning of "modify", Stevens would still probally defend it as the action of a
rational institutional actor- best postured to regulate long-distance competition- that,
upon becoming effective, would have received the broadest social acceptance as con-
sistent with the purpose of the Act. As such, Stevens implies that the 92 Order possesses
the "integrity" that Dworkin feels all law must embody. 
79
Seeing emerging competition in the long distance market as a situation warranting
the 92 Order as the appropriate regulatory response, Stevens seems to argue intuitively
that the meaning of "modify" must be allowed to evolve in step with a communications
industry that he believes to be "unusually dynamic., 80 For Stevens, the majority's pre-
vention of such evolution clearly defeats the spirit, or purpose, of the Act.81 In this re-
spect, he portrays Scalia's definition of "modify" as frozen in time, unable to account
for the statutory, or special, context in which Congress used the word, and thereby as
71. To the extent that legal process advocates judicial statutory interpretation on a continuous basis, it is
similar to William Eskridge's "dynamic statutory interpretation." See ESKRIDGE, supra note 1.
72. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 148.
73. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 143-58; See Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1600-01.
74. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986).
75. See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 538-57 (1997);
HAR & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1-9.
76. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 237-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 239-44 (Steveng, J., dissenting).
79. DWORKIN, sdpra note 74, at 338-40.
80. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. See id. See also, Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1618-19 (pointing out that the Supreme Court, in United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), established that a textualist reading of title VII would "violate the
spirit or purpose of the Act."). See Weber, 443 U.S. at 201. This seems to be exactly what Stevens is asserting
about Scalia's textualist reading of 47 U.S.C. § 203.
2000]
Journal of Legislation
insufficient to adequately address social change.82 In light of this, Stevens believes that
"modify", as all statutory words, must be given its purposive meaning at the time the
Supreme Court is considering the dispute between MCI and AT&T.83 Consistent with
legal process theory, especially with its principles of reasoned elaboration, defining
statutory words at the time they are presented for interpretation promotes legal effi-
ciency and enables a rational application of law over time.84 Determining the meaning of
statutory language in this fashion thereby allows judges essentially to update statutes in
a way that accommodates present day social values.
85
B. Proper Sources of Law
Scalia's emphasis on plain meaning at the time of enactment enables him strategi-
cally to narrow his inquiry in MCI v. AT&T to a specific and limited number of
sources.86 Conversely, because Stevens' inquiry takes place in the broader and historical
context of statutory purpose, he refers to a wide-ranging variety of sources in coming to
his legal conclusion.87 An analysis of Scalia's sources provides an excellent discourse in
textualist thinking. Determined to extract the plain meaning of the word "modify",
Scalia first resorts to the text of section 203(b)(2) without ever straying too far away
from it.88 To reiterate, his justification for such a textual emphasis is that "modify", as it
appears in 203(b)(2), is a clear and unambiguous term, the plain meaning of which is
readily apparent from a simple reading of the language. 89 Because he is able to easily
ascertain the plain meaning of "modify" from a reading of the Act, Scalia apparently
feels no need to look far beyond the text for statutory meaning.90 It seems that he does
not consult any secondary sources such as legislative history because, on an elementary
level, the ordinary meaning of "modify" is obvious and does not compel an absurd result
in this case.9 1 Based on this lbgic, Scalia primarily confirms his reading of "modify" by
briefly citing D.C. Circuit precedent and referring to dictionaries that offer only the
narrow definition of the term.
92
While his inquiry as well begins with a look at the statutory text, Stevens seems to
conclude that the use of the word "modify" in section 203(b)(2) is not clear, but rather,
possessive of a dual meaning, almost as immediately as Scalia determines the word to
be straightforwardly narrow in meaning.93 Consistent with the reasoned elaboration
contingent of legal process theory, Stevens attempts to clarify this language ambiguity
by canvassing the background of the Act, acknowledging the overall statutory context,
and seriously considering the particular facts presented in MCI v. AT&T. 94 Inevitably,
Stevens, in more eclectic fashion, seems to draw from almost any source within reason
that supports his purposive argument so as to fit the Act into a coherent body of com-
munications law.95
82. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 235-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. See HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 143-49.
85. See Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1600-02.
86. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 225, 230, 232 (Scalia, J.).
87. See id. at 235-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 224-25 (Scalia, J.).
89. See id. at 225 (Scalia, J.).
90. See id. (Scalia, J.).
91. See id. (Scalia, J.).
92. See id. at 224-34 (Scalia, J.).
93. See id. at 241, 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 235-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A large part of the debate in MCI v. AT&T appears focused around Scalia's extraor-
dinary reliance on dictionaries.96 Because textualists assume that "dictionaries are the
best source of the common understanding of words, ' 97 Scalia appears to base his com-
plete understanding of the word "modify" upon the guidance provided to him from the
dictionaries of his choosing. 98 In so doing, he does not consider arguments about policy,
history, or legal efficiency. The dictionaries in which Scalia carefully places the most
faith are those that (1) were at least circulating in 1934, and (2) did not propose that
"modify" indicates both minor and major change. 99 Limiting his use of dictionaries to
these qualifications in the final analysis, Scalia, without further comment, says, "[t]o our
knowledge all English dictionaries provided [when the Communications Act became
law] the narrow definition of 'modify,' .... [w]e have not the slightest doubt that is the
meaning the statute intended." 100 In so far as he does not further justify such adamant
reliance upon these dictionaries, some of which were sixty years old, the general con-
nection between dictionaries and plain meaning for Scalia is perhaps self-evident.'
0 1
In true legal process form, Stevens notes that "[d]ictionaries can be useful aids in
statutory interpretation, but they are no substitute for close analysis of what words mean
as used in a particular statutory context."10 2 This is to say that, "dictionaries [are] a
'way' to identify permissible statutory meanings," but they cannot form the basis of a
legal conclusion as Scalia would have it.'0 3 In addition to implying that "modify" does
not have an unambiguous meaning as Scalia contends, Stevens explains that the diction-
aries available for reference do not help in clarifying the meaning of the term.'0 4 He
points to a number of dictionaries that include the broader definition of "modify" as a
"meaning the word will bear."' 0 5 In light of this, he believes that the definition of "mod-
ify" is broad enough to justify a resort to secondary sources and ultimate judicial defer-
ence under Chevron to the FCC's interpretation of the word as consistent with the pur-
pose of the Act.
10 6
Along these same lines, commentators such as William Eskridge and Philip P.
Frickey have argued that in selectively choosing among dictionaries, Scalia engages in
dictionary shopping that undermines his textualist theory. 0 7 To the extent that Scalia
overlooks some dictionaries that were around in 1934, and that included more expansive
definitions of "modify", Eskridge and Frickey have suggested that Scalia's holding in
MCI v. AT&T is disingenuous to the plain meaning of section 203.108 Because they seem
convinced that the dictionaries Scalia fails to consider clearly indicate that the broader
meaning of "modify" is consistent with that term's plain meaning, Eskridge and Frickey
assert that Scalia's "dogmatic" reliance on a narrow class of dictionaries has less to do
with his allegiance to plain meaning than with the Supreme Court's inclination to
"give[] the benefit of the doubt to businesses ... that have made it in [their respective
96. See id. at 225-28 (Scalia, J.) and 240-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Randolph, supra note 36, at 1442.
98. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 225-28 (Scalia, J.).
99. See id. (Scalia, J.).
100. Id. at 228 (Scalia, J.).
101. See Randolph, supra note 36, at 1442.
102. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Randolph, supra note 36, at 1440. See HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1220.
104. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 241-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1375. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 240-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 41, at 73-75 (critiquing Scalia's textualist opinion in MCI v. AT&T).
108. Id. at73-75.
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service] market[s]."' 10 9 In this case, AT&T, which was the lone monopolistic provider of
communications services for years, was the winning business."10
Essentially, the Eskridge and Frickey argument fails to consider that none of the
dictionaries relied upon by Stevens advance the broader definition of "modify" alone." '
Instead, they all offer both the narrow and broad definitions together. On the other hand,
the majority of the dictionaries Scalia could find offer only the narrow definition. At
most, it might be said that Scalia believes that consensus is what gives rise to a term's
plain meaning while inconsistency cannot have any bearing on plain meaning. Criticiz-
ing Webster's Third Edition dictionary, 1 2 Scalia states, "[W]hen the word 'modify' has
come to mean both 'to change in some respects' and 'to change fundamentally' it will in
fact mean neither of those things."'1 3 Furthermore, Eskridge and Frickey advocate Stev-
ens' point that Scalia paid no mind to Black's Law Dictionary 1 4 which, in 1933, defined
"'modification' as an alteration which introduces new elements into the details, or can-
cels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter in
tact."' 5 Even though Scalia might not have considered this definition directly, he clearly
establishes that the 92 Order, in that it terminated the 203(a) filing requirement for
every common carrier except AT&T, could not possibly have been construed to leave
the general purpose and effect of the filing requirement in tact." 6 Scalia's claims do
seem to be good defenses to the Eskridge and Frickey criticisms that he is not necessar-
ily driven by text and faithful to plain meaning.
In the alternative, Stevens appears to raise a more fundamental Hart and Sacks ob-
jection to Scalia's reliance on dictionaries, and more specifically to Scalia's limited use
of legal sources. Consistent with principles of reasoned elaboration, Stevens suggests
that Scalia's terse analysis of statutory meaning lacks the proper explanation necessary
to relate his decision in some reasoned fashion to the Act, the statute out of which the
dispute between MCI and AT&T arose."17 He states, "[e]ven if the sole possible mean-
ing of 'modify' were to make 'minor' changes, further elaboration is needed to show
why the de-tariffing policy should fail."" 8 Stevens then proceeds to justify his legal
conclusion upon what he clearly believes to be rational policy grounds, historical and
factual accounts, and empirical observations." 9 In so doing, Stevens makes his legal
process appeal, maintaining that nearly complete reliance on dictionaries renders
Scalia's textualism in this case "an incomplete approach to statutory interpretation"
because it places too much faith in the finality of language. 120 Throughout his opinion,
Stevens refers to evidence well beyond the statutory text and dictionaries that Scalia
refuses to consider.' 2 1 Stevens continually emphasizes that the FCC's decision to ex-
empt non-dominant carriers from the 203(a) filing requirement was "rational" and
"measured, . . . remain[ing] faithful to the core purpose of the tariff- filing require-
109. Id. at 74-75.
110. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 41, at 75 n. 215. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 234 (Scalia, J.
affirming the D.C. Circuit ruling).
111. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 226 n. 2 (Scalia, J.) and 240-43 n. 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 227 (Scalia, J.).
113. Id.
114. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 41, at 74-75.
115. See Black's Law Dictionary 1198 (3d ed. 1933).
116. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 230-31 (Scalia, J.).
117. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 241, 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 241-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at cxxviii-cxxix n. 332.
121. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 235-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ment." 22 He is careful to point out that the 92 Order emerged from the Commission's
careful consideration of the tariff requirement beginning with the advent of long dis-
tance service market competition, and therefore, legally, and correctly, "relaxes a costly
regulatory requirement that recent developments had rendered pointless and counterpro-
ductive in a certain class of cases."1 23 In this respect, Stevens postures himself to argue
that, notwithstanding its plain meaning, a broader definition of "modify", as used in
203(b)(2), is justified by the necessary consideration of all factors which come to bear
on the situation at issue. 12 4 He states, "modifications may be narrow or broad, depending
upon the Commission's appraisal of current conditions.' 25 To this extent, Stevens' legal
process approach advocates the Hart and Sacks notion that determinations of law can
indeed be based upon important empirical, or descriptive, considerations transcending
the scope of the rigidly normative textualist inquiries.
26
C. Determining the Proper Role of the Courts, Federal Agencies,
and the Legislature
Serving, perhaps, as the primary justifications for both textualism and legal process
theory are the principles that these theories advocate concerning the proper role for the
institutional branches of American government. 27 Fundamentally, Scalia's emphasis on
the plain meaning of the word "modify," confirmed by, for the most part, the dictionary,
is guided by strict notions of "judicial restraint, democratic accountability," and "con-
stitutional formalism."'128 Adherence to these principles produce Scalia's view that law
arises out of the formal functioning of institutions that play finite roles: Congress makes
laws, agencies implement them, and the courts interpret and enforce them. 29 This view,
which can be seen as a formal type of institutional settlement, rejects the principle of
Hart and Sacks reasoned elaboration that law is shaped by the loose interplay of institu-
tions. 130 While Stevens sees the 92 Order as the appropriate end result of ad hoc, yet
rational, agency determinations, Scalia sees it as an attempt by the FCC to legislate, a
function that is exclusively reserved for Congress. 13 1 Likewise, Scalia rejects Stevens'
suggestion that the Supreme Court must defer to the FCC's actions, even if the 92 Order
is inconsistent with the language of the Act, because, in Scalia's mind, only Congress
may redraft the plain language of section 203 in response to new developments in the
communications industry.1
32
As Scalia states:
[flor better or worse, the Act establishes a rate-regulation, filed-tariff system for
common-carrier communications, and the Commission's desire... to alter the well-
established statutory filed rate requirement. . . 'is a consideration[s] address[ing] it-
self to Congress, not to the courts."
33
122. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. See HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at cxxviii- cxxix n. 332.
127. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3-37; HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1-181.
128. Randolph, supra note 36, at 1441.
129. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3-37.
130. See Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1614-20.
131. See MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 232-34 (Scalia, J.).
132. Id. at 234 (Scalia, J.).
133. Id. (Scalia, J.).
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Implicit in Scalia's majority opinion is that courts are constitutionally prohibited from
updating statutory law in a way, as Stevens suggests, that reflect their own values.' 34 For
Scalia, judicial updating, or policy-making, usurps the function of the legislature in vio-
lation of the separation of powers doctrine.' 35 Borrowing, to some extent, from nine-
teenth century formalism, Scalia believes that "judges declare what the law 'is,' [t]hey
do not make new law" as if they were legislators themselves.1 36 While Scalia might
embrace judicial activism in a common law setting, he adamantly rejects it in MCI v.
AT&T because the correct interpretation of a statute is at issue.1 37 He also seems to sug-
gest that Congress is far more competent than the courts to reshape statutes according to
policy because it is the institution most in touch with the political forces that drive pol-
icy in the first place.
138
Consequently, Scalia's sources of law for determining the meaning of modify can be
seen in a sense as safe sources. They are either other official legal sources, or they are
non-legal sources whose use is so widespread (e.g. dictionaries) that they do not allow
the judiciary to speculate about statutory meaning at the risk of functioning as the legis-
lature. In Scalia's mind, the further one drifts from the text, "answers to statutory cases
are found not in the 'law' but the judge's own views of justice, fairness, or social wel-
fare."1 39 This is precisely his objection to Stevens' legal process dissent. 40 Scalia rejects
the judicial activism promoted by legal process because a broad inquiry into the pur-
pose, political background, statutory context, and the factual situation at issue allows
Stevens to ask "what meaning ought to be given to the directions of the statute in the
respects relevant to the case" as opposed to what the statute says. 14 1 This overly broad
inquiry into law then allows judges, who have no business doing so, playing the role of
the "Mr. Fix It" common law judge in spite of clear statutory standards. 142
Furthermore, Scalia disagrees with Stevens' implicit argument, which is similar to
an argument made by Cass R. Sunstein, that the FCC, as a federal agency, should be
given more discretion to "adjust [statutory] text to circumstances" just as a common law
court might adjust precedent to circumstances. 143 For Scalia, allowing the 92 Order to
stand on such a justification in this instance would have probably been just as contrary
to the separation of powers doctrine as a decision by the Supreme Court to broadly in-
terpret the term of "modify" based on policy preferences. 144 Had he perceived the Act to
be silent or ambiguous with respect to permissible changes of the 203(a) filing require-
ment, Scalia suggests that, under Chevron, he might have accepted the 92 Order as a
type of common law gap filler, necessarily supplementing the act without superceding it
in relevant part. 145 However, because he feels that the 92 Order creates new law in dis-
regard for the clear statutory standard set forth in section 203, Scalia determines that the
134. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 230-34 (Scalia, J.).
135. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3-37; Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1614-18.
136. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 623 n. 11.
137. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 234 (Scalia, J.); SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23-25.
138. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 231-34 (Scalia, J.).
139. Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1619 (citing Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987))
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. See MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 234.
141. HART & SAcKs, supra note 6, at 1374. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 18-22.
142. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 14.
143. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 533, 546, 553.
144. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3-37.
145. See MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 229-31 (Scalia, J.).
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FCC, in promulgating the 92 Order, had imprudently assumed the policy-making role of
Congress by updating the Act. 
14 6
111. Legislative Updating Versus Judicial Updating
With its adoption of Scalia's textualist methodology in MCI v. AT&T, the Supreme
Court gave binding legal effect to the D.C. Circuit's longstanding refusal to read the
term "modify" broadly as a means of updating section 203.47 Despite Stevens' plea for
such an update, Scalia makes clear in MCI v. AT&T that any increase in the FCC's
203(b)(2) modification authority could not come from either the federal judiciary or the
Commission itself.148 Rather, such regulatory relief would have to come from Con-
gress. 1
49
A. The 1996 Actas a Legislative Update
As fate would have it, Congress did ultimately grant the FCC the broad regulatory
authority that it had long-since sought to claim pursuant to section 203(b)(2). 50 Just two
years after the Supreme Court's decision in MCI v. AT&T, Congress passed the 96 Act,
which added a new section 10 to the Act.' 5 1 This addition undeniably empowers the
FCC to forbear from enforcing the 203(a) filing requirement altogether, if necessary. 152
Moreover, the authority granted under new section 10 allows the FCC to forbear from
enforcing any statutory requirement, whether related to tariff filing or not.
153
Fundamentally, section 10 works to diminish the importance of the merits of MCI v.
AT&T as decided by the Supreme Court. In affording the FCC with a separate and
clearer framework for forbearance, section 10 of the Act, as amended, makes the debate
over the meaning of "modify" in section 203 seem like an eleven year headache that
could have been avoided. 154 Interestingly enough, however, Congress did not directly
amend the language of section 203 of the Act in any respect. On the contrary, the lan-
guage of section 203 itself is no different now than it was in 1934. Furthermore, Con-
gress did not choose to provide a new statutory definition for the word "modify". In
relevant part, subsections 10(a) and (b) of the Act, as amended, provide:
... the Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of
this Act to a telecommunications carrier [of] telecommunications service, or class of
... carriers of... services .... if the Commission determines that- (1) enforcement
of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges .... by, for,
or in connection with [a carrier of service] are just and reasonable .. .; (2) enforce-
ment of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers;
and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the
public interest. 155 (b) . . . - In making the determination (a)(3), the Commission
shall consider whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will
146. See id. at 231-34 (Scalia, J.).
147. See id. at 233-34 (Scalia, J.).
148. Id. at 234 (Scalia, J.).
149. Id. (Scalia, J.).
150. PETER W. HUBER, ET. AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: A SPECIAL REPORT 60-63
(Little, Brown and Co. 1996).
151. 47 U.S.C. § 160. See HUBER, ET. AL., supra note 156, at 60. See also, note 35.
152. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
153. Id.
154. See supra note 15.
155. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
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promote competitive market conditions, including the extent to which such forbear-
ance will enhance competition among providers of telecommunications services.
156
If the FCC chooses to relax the 203(a) filing requirement pursuant to section 10, the
question of whether "modify" means to make minor changes in, or to make more fun-
damental and basic changes in, is irrelevant to determining the legality of such an action.
With the passage of the 96 Act, the FCC may now relax the 203(a) filing requirement
for non-dominant carriers without having to rely on its section 203(b) modification
authority to do so. Because section 10 does not at all suggest that forbearance should be
limited to any extent or degree, it appears safe for the Commission to disregard MCI v.
AT&T with a simple thought in mind: that the meaning of "modify" in Section 203 is no
longer relevant. As it stands, unless the FCC is stubborn enough to once again suspend
the legal effect of 203(a) under the guise of its 203(b)(2) modification power, the hold-
ing in MCI v. AT&T will be inapplicable.
Most important to the textualist-legal process debate for purposes of this article are
some specific considerations regarding the connection between the holding in MCI v.
AT&T and section 10. In providing the FCC with authority that the Supreme Court had
determined was not available to the Commission under section 203(b)(2), section 10 can
be perceived as a legislative update of the section 203 regulatory scheme. As such, it is
relevant to whether MCI v. AT&T indicates that the forcing of legislative updating
through textualist interpretation, or rather judicial updating of obsolete statutes, is the
better approach.
Essentially, any claim that Scalia's textualist approach is best because it forces leg-
islative responsiveness seems most plausible if there is good reason to believe that the
textualist decision in MCI v. AT&T did actually induce Congress to enact section 10 into
law. If it is more clear than not that section 10 represents Congress' attempt to correct
the regulatory deficiency of the Act as exposed by Scalia in MCI v. AT&T- that the
limited meaning of "modify" in 203(b)(2) prevents the FCC from exercising the neces-
sary regulatory authority over the communications industry- then textualism seems to
work as Scalia claims it does. Importantly enough, however, a purposivist might argue
that the appeal of textualism is vulnerable to an argument implied by Stevens' adoption
of the Sunstein notion concerning administrative agencies- that consistent with legal
process methodology, the broad language of Section 10 allows the FCC to act as a
common law court in making its own determinations of relevant law and fact, subject to
review by increasingly deferential federal courts in the wake of Chevron.157 In this re-
spect, Congress might be seen to have, in effect, endorsed judicial updating of the com-
munications regulatory regime where the Commission determines, upon ad hoc policy
grounds, that a particular statutory provision is no longer necessary for regulating com-
munications carriers. In addition, even if the textualist decision in MCI v. AT&T actually
forced Congress to respond, a purposivist might still assert that the textualist decision
imposed unnecessary costs because Congress ended up giving the FCC the authority that
Stevens wanted it to have anyway. To this extent, it is simply not clear why a court
should require legislative updating when the court itself can produce the same result
more efficiently.
156. 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).
157. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 241-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sunstein, supra note 75, at 531.
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B. The Nexus between MCI v. AT&T and Section 10
That section 10 serves as a reaction to MCI v. AT&T is more than plausible. 158 Fun-
damentally, an account of the statutory history of the 96 Act, together with an analysis
of the factors which motivated Congress to pass the 96 Act, strongly suggest that Con-
gress was not only aware of MCI v. AT&T when it enacted section 10, but in addition,
that Congress enacted section 10 as a response to MCI v. AT&T.
Even before enactment of the 96 Act, it was widely accepted that the current com-
munications laws needed a shot in the arm to keep pace with consumer demands of
service market competition. 159 Slightly closer to the time of enactment, many key mem-
bers of Congress, both minority and majority, had been considering the development of
long distance market competition as consumer constituents were growing more and
more concerned about the price of their long distance service. 160 In response to the
growing consensus that new legislation was needed to spur competition, and thereby
drive down prices, Congress was closely following a broad range of legal and regulatory
activity, which was relevant to telephony, that had transpired since the divestiture of
AT&T in 1984.16 Because the long and hard struggle that took place between the D.C.
Circuit and the FCC over the 203(a) filing requirement had been so pertinent to long-
distance market competition, and no doubt, significantly less than subtle,1 62 MCI v.
AT&T cannot be presumed to have escaped Congress's attention.' 63 Interestingly
enough, even the lawyers for MCI, AT&T, and the FCC, during their oral arguments
before the Supreme Court in the matter of MCI v. AT&T, acknowledged that Congress
was aware of their respective interpretations of section 203 and "the decade- long tug of
war between the Commission and the D.C. Circuit over the authority to relax filing re-.
quirements .... ."' 64 Ultimately then, it is quite conceivable that Congress was aware of
the issue involved in MCI v. AT&T.
158. There are primarily two factors which make such a presumption reasonable: the historical and political
events leading up to and surrounding the passage of the 96 Act, and the clear desire of the 104th Congress to
introduce increased competition to communications service markets through an overhaul, or update, of the
outdated regulatory framework of the Act.
159. See PAUL W. MACAvOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH
COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES (1996). See generally, HUBER, ET. AL., supra note
150; See also, THOMAS G. KRATITENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY (1994); Wharton
Econometric Forecasting Associates, Study, Economic Impact of Eliminating The Line-of-Business restrictions
(February 1995) [hereinafter WEFA Study]; 141 CONG. REC. H8463 (daily ed., August 4, 1995) (statement of
Congressman Dingell) [hereinafter Dingell statement].
160. See Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201(1996); WEFA Study, supra
note 159; Dingell Statement, supra note 159; Remarks of the Honorable John D. Dingell to the Computer &
Communications Industry Association, June 10, 1996 [hereinafter Dingell Remarks]; KNAUER, MACHTLEY,
LYNCH, ET. AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT HANDBOOK, A COMPLETE REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS 11-21
(1996).
161. See generally, HUBER, ET. AL., supra note 150; KNAUER, ET. AL., surpra note 160, at 11-17. See also,
S. REP. No. 23, 10 4 " Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 204, 10 4 ' Cong., 2d" Sess. 49-50 (1995);
Dingell Remarks, supra note 166.
162. See supra note 13.
163. This argument is, largely, based on three telephone interviews I conducted with Jim Greene, John
Windhausen, and Earl Comstock. See, infra note 165. While Greene is an FCC official, his suggestion that
section 10 was induced by MCI v. AT&T is corroborated by both Windhausen and Comstock, former attorneys
for the Senate Committee on Commerce, who were ultimately responsible, along with few others, for drafting
the language of section 10. Id.
164. MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 233 (Scalia, J.).
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Building on this further, the factual accounts of three individuals who were essential
in the enactment of the '96 Act, reveal that MCI v. AT&T can be perceived as a Supreme
Court case that induced section 10.165 By the account of Jim Greene, an FCC Official
who served as a Congressional liaison regarding the 96 Act, the volatile battles between
the D.C. Circuit and the FCC had drawn the attention of key Senators, both Democratic
and Republican, who maintained a keen interest in communications law. 16 6 Furthermore,
according to Greene the language that, with only a few minor changes, ultimately be-
came section 10 of the Act as amended was put into S. 652 (the Senate version of the 96
Act)1 67 by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) to alleviate the situation caused by the Supreme
Court's holding in MCI v. AT&T. 
168
Consistent with this are the comments of John Windhausen who was Senior Counsel
to the Committee on Commerce when the 96 Act was enacted.169 According to Wind-
hausen, MCI v. AT&T indicated to Congress that the Commission's current 203(b)(2)
modification power was not presently sufficient to facilitate the needs of non-dominant
carriers, either new or old, which could not effectively compete if forced to incur the
high transaction costs of filing tariffs under 203(a). 170 Because they did not want the
progress of service market competition to be hindered in the future, Windhausen indi-
cated that Senators Stevens, Hollings, and Inouye spearheaded the initiative for section
10, which, as an original provision of S. 652, drew little to no opposition from either
Democrats or Republicans. 71
Finally, Earl Comstock, who was the Senate Commerce Committee's majority
Counsel that drafted section 10 into S. 652, stated that MCI v. AT&T, among other
things, "was certainly a consideration when constructing section 1O.,172 Comstock, who
put section 10 into S. 652 at the request of Senator Stevens, suggested that MCI v. AT&T
provided additional insight into the regulatory shortcomings of the Act, and more clearly
demonstrated how the existing forbearance standards could be updated. 73 Just as Wind-
hausen had seen it, Comstock and Senator Stevens felt as if section 10 was the proper
165. Telephone Interview with Jim Greene, Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs of the
Federal Communications Commission, (Apr. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Greene Interview]; Telephone Interview
with John Windhausen, former counsel to the Senate Committee on Commerce, (Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter
Windhausen Interview]; Telephone Interview with Earl Comstock, former Majority Counsel to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, (Apr. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Comstock Interview]. The content of these interviews
is revealed in the body of this article.
166. Greene Interview, supra note 165. Although not all members of Congress may have been aware of
MCI v. AT&T, such overwhelming knowledge is not necessary to support the argument that MCI v. AT&T
induced the enactment of section 10. What is important is that the key members of Congress, whose staffs
implemented the language of section 10 into the 96 Act did so with MCI v. AT&T in mind. As an FCC
representative who was in constant contact with these members and their staffs, Mr. Greene has confirmed that
the language of section 10 was, in large part, a reaction to MCI v. AT&T. He indicated that all of the legal
commotion between 1985 and 1995 concerning 203(b)(2) modification was too significant for the Senators in
the Committee on Commerce to ignore. Id.
167. S. 652, 104
th Cong., 2"d Sess. § 303 (1995). Section 303 of S. 652 is almost identical to section 10 of
the Act, as amended. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 458, 104" Cong., 2"" Sess. 184-85. This Conference report
confirms that section 10 is fundamentally based on, or essentially traces, the language of § 303 of S. 652.
168. Greene Interview, supra note 165.
169. Windhausen Interview, supra note 165.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Comstock Interview, supra note 165.
173. Id.
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update to the Act, a statute that could not sustain, or allow for, the competition that was
desired and needed.1
74
Based on these accounts, it seems that Congress consciously enacted section 10 to
avoid a situation like MCI v. AT&T down the road. As alluded to earlier, MCI v. AT&T,
in that it addressed a regulatory measure meant to stimulate long-distance service com-
petition, was highly relevant to the number one and ambitious priority of the 96 Act: to
"open[] all telecommunications markets to competition.' 7 5 To the extent that the FCC
had similarly promulgated the 92 Order in the interest of competition, it appears that
Congress and the FCC agreed, at least from a policy standpoint, that the existing regu-
latory framework would have to change in order to accommodate new competition. This
is to say that the Commission's interests were seemingly aligned with Congressional
interests following the decision in MCI v. AT&T. Congress wanted service market com-
petition and the FCC wanted the authority to adequately de-regulate through forbearance
so that such competition could thrive.
176
C. Stating a Case for Legislative Updating
As the most sweeping regulatory reform legislation in communications industry
history,177 the 96 act is clearly a response to the public cry for Congress to provide a
new order in communications. 178 Given the high probability that MCI v. AT&T induced
section 10, Scalia's textualist opinion in that case is best perceived as an important voice
in the crowd. By pledging strong allegiance to the text of section 203, Scalia draws at-
tention to this statutory provision as a legal mechanism in need of legislative repair. By
prohibiting the FCC from acting in a way that he felt could have very well been good for
the communications industry, and by interpreting the word "modify" as narrowly as he
does, Scalia implies that if the premise of the FCC Order is in the public interest, then it
is high time for Congress to empower the Commission to do more for the industry. 79
Because section 10 does in fact empower the FCC to do more in the interest of commu-
nications competition, it appears to serve as the response to Scalia's wake-up call.'80
Scalia's claim that textualism forces legislative responsiveness also seems well sup-
ported by the suggestions of Greene, Windhausen, and Comstock.' 8 1 As all three admit-
ted in some way, the holding in MCI v. AT&T effectively exposes the deficiencies of the
Act with respect to forbearance.' 82 While Comstock suggested that Senator Stevens had
more than just the 203(a) filing requirement in mind when section 303 of S. 652 was
reported out of the Senate Committee on Commerce, he did make quite clear that one of
the Congressional priorities in drafting this regulatory forbearance section was to legis-
late around the holding in MCI v. AT&T 183 In so far as section 10, which again,
emerged primarily from section 303 of S. 652, purposively gives the FCC an alternative
to the exercising its modification power under 203(b)(2), section 10 clearly is not only a
174. Id.; see also Windhausen Interview, supra note 165.
175. The 96 Act, supra note 32, at 1; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 458, 104 t Cong., 2nd Sess. 113 (1996).
176. See HUBER, ET. AL., supra note 150, at 60; KNAUER, ET. AL., supra note 160; Greene Interview,
supra note 171. See generally, MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218.
177. See Farrell, supra note 159.
178. 142 CONG. REc. S686 (daily ed., Feb. 1, 1995) (Statement of Senator Pressler).
179. MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 233-34. (Scalia, J.).
180. Compare 47 U.S.C. §§ 160 and 203.
181. See supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 165, 172-74 and accompanying text.
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legislative update of the Act, but it is also a legislative response to the problem that
Scalia's wooden reading of section 203 rendered easily discoverable.
It is also worth noting that Congress provided section 10 without any indication that
subsection 203(b)(2) was to be directly amended. While this may be evidence that Con-
gress just forgot to address the meaning of "modify", it is more likely that Scalia con-
vinced Congress to leave 203(b)(2) in deference to his narrow reading of "modify".
Conceding that the Supreme Court was correct in concluding that 203(b)(2) does not
enable the FCC to relax the 203(a) filing requirement as needed, Congress, as suggested
by the three interviewees, enacted section 10 to rectify this situation. Furthermore, by
leaving section 203 intact and unchanged, Congress can be presumed to have recognized
that the Commission may still need to invoke its modification authority under subsection
203(b)(2) in situations that call for some intervention, but not for action as significant as
forbearance. Suppose, for instance, that the Commission desires to extend the 203(a)
filing deadline for certain carriers because, in light of certain circumstances, it is reason-
able to do so. Or, suppose that the Commission changes the filing deadline for all carri-
ers so that their eventually filed tariffs are adjusted to accurately reflect inflation rates in
a given year. Better yet, suppose that the Commission can establish an objectively good
cause for granting a certain common carrier or carrier(s) a temporary, or short of indefi-
nite, reprieve from the filing obligation. It is possible to continue proposing certain sce-
narios which would justify the Commission's modification of the 203(a) filing require-
ment, but, what is essential to recognize is that these scenarios do not require full for-
bearance considerations by the Commission under subsection 10(a). On the contrary,
such matters, which probably arise quite frequently, can be solved much more easily and
efficiently in a 203(b)(2) modification proceeding. The fact that 203(b)(2) is still around
to accommodate situations calling for less than forbearance, strongly suggests that the
10 4 th Congress conceded to Scalia's narrow reading of "modify".
D. Stating a Case for Judicial Updating
Despite that section 10 can be perceived as a response to MCI v. AT&T, the lan-
guage of section 10 might be read as a validation of the Stevens and Sunstein view that a
federal agency should have the authority to continually adjust the law to fit the circum-
stances.184 Arguably, section 10 contemplates that the Commission considers situational
factors, which debatably exist outside of the codified law itself, for the purpose of effec-
tively regulating the communications industry on a rational and on-going basis. 85
As cited above, the text of section 10 appears to be very similar to the version of the
statutory purpose of the Act proposed by Stevens in MCI v. AT&T. To reiterate, Stevens
argued that the Act was meant to give the FCC broad discretion and "ample leeway to
interpret and apply its statutory powers and responsibilities. 1 86 In like terms, section 10
requires the Commission to essentially nullify the legal effect of any provision of the
Act, as amended, at any.given time, based upon its own factual determinations. 87 With-
out much thought, it seems undeniable that the power to apply, or not apply, any section
of the Act, as amended, gives the Commission broad discretion and ample leeway to
regulate common carriers. In addition, because section 10 sets no statutory deadline by
which the FCC is required to have completed its forbearance proceedings, it is not un-
184. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(e); MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sunstein, supra
note 75, at 533.
185. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(e).
186. MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 235 (Stevens J., dissenting).
187. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3).
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reasonable to assume that Congress has, in passing the Act of 96, adopted the Hart and
Sacks view that law is a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living.
Section 10 can easily be read as indefinitely reserving the Commission's authority to
forbear in order to correct basic inefficiencies, or problems, with the existing telecom-
munications regulatory scheme. Making even more clear that the FCC has continuous
forbearance authority under section 10, is that subsection 10(c) clearly establishes the
framework by which private parties are to petition the FCC for forbearance as their
regulatory concerns develop over time.1 8 8 This framework is simply bereft of any stipu-
lation that regulated entities will have waived their right to petition should they fail to do
so within a particular time. On the contrary, Congress seems to have contemplated that
the continuous petition process will complement the Commission's ad hoc forbearance
determinations.
Stevens begins his dissent in MCI v. AT&T by stating a general observation, yet one
that is very important for his legal process approach. As mentioned above, he opens his
attack on Scalia and the majority by proposing that "[t]he communications industry has
a dynamic character."' 89 This implies that Stevens sees the communications industry as
expanding, continually changing over time, and thereby likely to pose new and unfore-
seen problems that can only be solved as they arise. 190 In true Hart and Sacks fashion,
Stevens then assumes that Congress, because it is "made up of reasonable persons pur-
suing reasonable purposes reasonably,"' 191 enacted subsection 203(b)(2) of the Act to
give the FCC the full flexibility to regulate carriers dynamically, or in a manner that is
sensitive to the industry's ever-changing character. 92 On the whole, section 10 does
seemingly provide the FCC with such "regulatory flexibility" as an apparent remedy to
the Supreme Court's determination that subsection 203(b)(2) did not.
While section 10 ensures that the FCC will inevitably practice Eskridge's dynamic
statutory interpretation, its language is also consistent with Hart and Sacks legal process.
As suggested above, one similarity between Eskridge's dynamic approach and legal
process is that they both promote statutory interpretation as a means of updating the
law. 19 3 Fundamentally, both approaches adhere to the principle that "the meaning of a
statute is not fixed until it is applied to concrete circumstances, and it is neither uncom-
mon nor illegitimate for the meaning of a provision to change over time.'194 In essen-
tially requiring the FCC to forbear whenever industry conditions warrant it, section 10
clearly establishes that the Commission is to prospectively interpret and apply all statu-
tory provisions of the Act, as amended, for the purpose of updating the law, or to make
it compatible with the most efficient, socially equitable, state of the communications
industry.195 In this respect, the framework of section 10 condones the Commission's
interpretive adjustments of the meanings of statutory words to make a desired impact
upon the communications industry. In almost exact terms, Stevens argued that the
Commission should have been able to rely on the broader definition of "modify", as
used in 203(b)(2) because an exemption from the 203(a) filing requirement for non-
dominant carriers was essential to striking the appropriate competitive balance between
such carriers and the dominant carrier (AT&T) in the long distance market. 196 Because
188. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(c).
189. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 235-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1378.
192. See MCIv. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 235-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 13-47.
194. Id. at 9.
195. See generally 47 U.S.C § 160.
196. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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section 10 contemplates the overall meaning of the Act, as amended, as evolving over
time, it can perhaps be argued that this provision does not embody Scalia's notion that
the time most relevant to interpreting a statute is the time of enactment.
Further possible support for judicial updating comes from the fact that section 10 re-
quires the FCC, before forbearing from enforcing a particular provision, to consider the
same factors on which Stevens based his legal conclusion in the dissent.' 97 Just as Stev-
ens did in his dissent, section 10 makes clear that the situation concerning the state of
the service market in question is highly relevant to a decision to suspend, to any degree,
the legal effect of any statutory provision, including subsection 203(a). While Stevens
justifies the 92 Order as the appropriate response to "new conditions in the communica-
tions industry, including stirrings of competition in the long distance telephone mar-
ket,"'1 98 section 10 similarly requires the FCC to pay attention to the reasonableness of
current service charges, the well-being of consumers, and the present state of service
market competition. 199 Even though these background considerations are not of a legal
nature, section 10 contemplates that they bear significantly on the nature of the law in
communications. 200 In this regard, section 10 seems to discount Scalia's view that
sources which are not either legal, or so widely relied on that they leave little opportu-
nity for speculation, are not relevant in shaping the law.
Because section 10 requires the FCC to continually shape the law according to the
circumstances at hand, it might be argued that it is a codification of legal process princi-
ples. Consistent with principles of reasoned elaboration, the Commission, as a result of
section 10, now seems armed with the statutory authority to return to the business of
responding to problems that arise in the communications industry. As such, the Com-
mission, it might be argued, is poised to continue developing and updating communica-
tions law as a coherent story, picking up where it had left off in its rule-making pro-
ceedings when the federal courts so rudely interrupted.
E. Why Legislative Updating Prevails over Judicial Updating
In light of the origin and nature of section 10, there are primarily two reasons why
Stevens' case for judicial updating is not as appealing as Scalia's demand for legislative
updating. One of these lays to rest the purposivist claim that the FCC must be perceived
to operate as a common law court free to integrate policy into law despite statutory in-
structions to the contrary. The other consideration establishes that a judicial update of
section 203(b)(2) in MCI v. AT&T would neither have provided the same policy result as
section 10, nor done so in a more efficient and less costly manner. To the contrary, a
closer examination of section 10 as the legislative response to MCI v. AT&T reveals that
Scalia's challenge to Congress ended up producing a more desirable standard for FCC
forbearance than a judicial update of section 203(b)(2) would have.
To be clear, the FCC and the federal courts should not read section 10 as contem-
plating common law type adjudication. Aside from a few specialized areas of the law,
such as antitrust, admiralty, or labor, there is no federal communications common law
despite the fact that much authority has been delegated to the FCC.20 1 To the contrary,
197. Compare MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 235-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3).
198. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3) and (b).
200. Id.
201. To date I can find no case suggesting that federal communications law is even in part common in
nature as opposed to statutory. Even the price setting authority given to the individual states under 47 U.S.C. §
252, is ultimately subject to some specific, federal statutory limitations. In this respect, section 10 as amended
cannot be seen to grant the kind of common law adjudicative authority to the FCC that, for instance, the Taft-
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communications law comes from federal statutes. 20 2 The standards by which the Com-
mission is to forbear are clearly prescribed by statute in subsection 10(a)(l)-(3), and, in
addition, a complete reading of this provision makes clear that the Commission is not
free to devise its own forbearance criteria not enumerated by Congress.20 3 As such, the
communications regulatory regime cannot possibly be altered in a way not conceived by
Congress. It follows then that section 10 has not effectively condoned the judicial up-
dating that Stevens argued was necessary in MCI v. AT&T. Instead, it requires the
Commission carry out a very specific statutory standard. Although the analogy Stevens
and Sunstein try to draw between common law courts and federal agencies seems inter-
esting, the perception of agencies as common law courts cannot be conflated with an
agency executing its statutory responsibilities. It cannot be denied that the whole point
of the first Chevron inquiry - whether there is a clear statutory standard governing the
situation at bar- is to ensure that an agency has obeyed Congress. Because section 10 is
such a standard, it cannot be assumed that the FCC and the courts will be crafting their
own rules as if section 10 were either non-governing or non-existent. Ultimately, be-
cause the 92 Order was not authorized under 203(b)(2), a position to which Congress
has apparently conceded, the Supreme Court was correct in choosing not to update the
statute itself by giving legal effect to the FCC's broad definition of "modify".
In addition, as alluded to above, the textualist decision in MCI v. AT&T was, more
than likely, instrumental in creating a comprehensive forbearance framework that a judi-
cial update of 203(b)(2) almost surely would not have induced. Ultimately, a broad in-
terpretation of the term "modify" by the Supreme Court could not possibly have given
the FCC with the broader, and seemingly most desirable, authority afforded to it by
Section 10. While such a judicial update of section 203 would have immediately given
the FCC more discretion over the enforcement of the 203(a) filing requirement, it is not
clear how a legal process decision in MCI v. AT&T could have empowered the Commis-
sion to forbear from enforcing any statutory provision. Because Scalia's textualism
seems to have induced this broad section 10 empowerment, the events that followed
MCI v. AT&T, namely the passage of the 96 Act, work to discredit any assumption by
the purposivist that judicial updating comes out in the same place as legislative updat-
ing. Frankly, because section 10 provided the FCC with more authority than it sought in
MCI v. AT&T, it thereby granted more forbearance authority than Stevens wanted the
Commission to have. In this respect, a decision by the Supreme Court to support Stev-
ens' conclusion of law might have ended up costing the FCC, and those common carri-
ers who benefit from regulatory forbearance, more than the textualist decision in MCI v.
AT&T may have cost them for the short term.
Also discredited by the broad scope of section 10 is the notion that, over time, the
practice of judicial updating will, more efficiently than legislative updating, result in the
enforcement of equitable and balanced regulatory policy. Because section 10 allows
forbearance with respect to every section of the Act, as amended, it would have taken an
indeterminate amount of piecemeal, court alterations of the statutory forbearance
framework for judicial updating to have produced the relief that section 10 provides.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that judicial updating of this sort could have
Hartley Act, or the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, grants to the courts. The provisions of the Act, as amended, such
as section 10, are simply too explicit to give rise to the presumption of common law authority. For a full
discussion of areas of federal common law, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 656-757 (Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Metzer, and David L. Shapiro eds.,
4ted. 1996).
202. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq..
203. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(e).
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eventually provided what section 10 has, there is simply no way of knowing how long it
might have taken for such a string of cases to develop; presumably, much longer than it
took Congress to provide forbearance for all statutory provisions as a response to MCI v.
AT&T. Based on this, the forcing of legislative updating appears entirely more efficient
than the judicial updating promoted by Stevens.
Furthermore, while the age and obsolescence of the Act might generally be factors
that are typically thought to support judicial updating, these factors actually enable
Scalia's democracy-forcing approach to work for him. Scalia's textualism in this in-
stance produced the most appropriate result because it exposed the real source of the
legal problem at issue: the regulatory insufficiency of the Act. To reiterate, at the time of
the decision in MCI v. AT&T Congress had been attempting to overhaul the existing
communications regulatory regime that was based on the long-standing provisions of the
Act.20 4 Almost all of the industry participants, were pushing for some Act of Congress to
enable service market competition and greater regulatory forbearance authority for the
FCC.20 5 Essentially, Scalia's narrow reading of the word "modify" was correct because
it was perfectly consistent with the narrow scope of the Act as a statute that had been
written long before there was any competition in the long distance business. Conse-
quently, Scalia's interpretation of "modify" crystallized just how outdated, and in need
of repair the Act really was. In indicating that the Act needed so much more updating
than the "quick fix" that a broad reading of "modify" could have provided, Scalia con-
vincingly made clear that Congress was the only democratic institution capable of cur-
ing the obvious deficiencies in the Act.
2 0 6
To the extent that it induced the comprehensive Section 10, the wooden holding in
MCI v. AT&T was better than any judicial attempt to stretch the language of the Act to
apply to a situation that its drafters never contemplated. So obsolete was the Act that a
decision by the Supreme Court to broadly interpret the term "modify" would have
worked only to conceal the Act's shortcomings by portraying it as sufficient to prospec-
tively foster forbearance compatible with the public interest. Had the Supreme Court
upheld the 92 Order, it is conceivable that the Congress may have been confused in its
task of providing an articulate forbearance standard.20 7 Had Congress, in the wake of a
legal process decision in MCI v. AT&T, enacted some less ambitious, or no additional
forbearance standard at all, the FCC might still be faced with having to determine
whether a particular proposed action for forbearance of 203(a) qualifies as a 203(b)(2)
modification. While it would be able to rely on MCI v. AT&T for the authority to relax
the filing requirement for non-dominant carriers, neither the Commission, nor any inter-
ested parties, could be fully certain that a never before tested attempt at forbearance
would be upheld under 203(b)(2). It follows then that judicial updating in MCI v. AT&T
would have probably served to perpetuate the legal uncertainty that had overshadowed
the FCC's forbearance powers since 1985.208
Bringing this uncertainty to an end, Congress, just two years after the decision in
MCI v. AT&T, responded by making section 10 a part of the most sweeping telecommu-
nications reform legislation that our nation has ever seen.20 9 Objectively speaking, sec-
tion 10 is as generous, clear, sensible, and complete, as any forbearance stan-
204. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
206. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 229-34 (Scalia, J.).
207. This was also something suggested by John Windhausen in the telephone interview I had with him.
See Windhausen Interview, supra notes 165, 169-71, 174 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 13.
209. See HUBER, ET. AL., supra note 150; Farrell, supra note 159; KNAUER, supra note 160.
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dard/procedure that the FCC and industry could have hoped for. As such, section 10
makes the law concerning the Commission's authority to forbear as clear, and predict-
able as possible. Ultimately then, the effect of textualist decision in MCI v. AT&T has
been to streamline the law in a way that is undeniably gracious to the FCC and quite
beneficial to all carriers who really need regulatory exemptions. No longer will the legal
effect of Commission forbearance Orders be unclear. They will either comply with sec-
tion 10 or they will not. Consequently, the possibility that one word, the meaning of
which may support rich connotations, will prevent necessary forbearance is now signifi-
cantly less likely.
IV. Conclusion
MCI v. AT&T demonstrates that textualist judges and legal process judges can reach
different conclusions of law, notwithstanding the simplicity of the particular issue before
them. Their differences concerning law, interpretive techniques, and appropriate institu-
tional activity simply seem too significant for them to agree where the facts of a case
require the full employment of theoretical tactic.
Because, however, the holding in MCI v. AT&T apparently induced Congress to en-
act section 10, a most clairvoyant legislative response, Scalia's textualism proved to be a
better approach than Stevens' legal process endorsement of judicial updating. This is to
say that Scalia's textualist decision in MCI v. AT&T meets head on the most fundamen-
tal challenge that might be raised against it in a debate over whether legislative updating
is better than judicial updating. Sunstein poses the question, "If judges interpret statutes
in accordance with the original meaning of their text, will legislative drafting be im-
proved, and will legislatures correct obvious mistakes?" 210 In light of the most probable
nexus between MCI v. AT&T and section 10, the answer is yes!
From this perspective, Scalia substantially contributed to the development of sound
public policy by refusing to declare what the prevailing policy should be in MCI v.
AT&T. His textualist discipline demonstrates that law can be so much more clear when
it emanates from Congress, the institution best suited for policy-making, as opposed to
the uncontrollable supremacy contest between institutions. The scope and clarity of
section 10 ultimately confirm Scalia's recognition that nobody, the courts and agencies
included, could have addressed the need for greater forbearance more completely than
Congress did. In one clean sweep, Congress has foreclosed issues concerning the extent
of FCC forbearance authority. Likewise, section 10 has ended the uncertainty that for
years had made a mockery out of the procedural and legal interplay between the FCC
and the federal courts.
Finally, it seems that Scalia accomplished his goals of making the law more pre-
dictable, forcing the legislature to be more accountable, keeping the judiciary out of the
policy-making process, and honoring his formal conceptions of institutional settlement.
Even Stevens would have to agree that section 10 leaves little to be desired. While he
might take issue with whether Scalia's textualism induced its enactment, it would be
difficult for him to deny that section 10 embodies the perfect policy balance: it is fair to
the FCC, to industry, and is thereby good for consumers. As a result, MCI v. AT&T
demonstrates how textualism and judicial restraint can be more virtuous than legal proc-
ess and judicial activism. Moreover, the probable nexus between the textualist decision
in MCI v. AT&T and section 10 of the Act, as amended, suggests that textualism, to coin
a phrase, can bring good things to those who wait; even to those who are forced to wait.
210. See Sunstein, supra note 75, at 532.
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